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Abstract 
The first part of this paper presents a coalition formation 
method for multi-agent systems which finds a Pareto optimal 
solution without aggregating the preferences of the agents. 
This protocol is adapted to problems requiring coordination 
by coalition formation, where it is undesirable, or not 
possible, to aggregate the preferences of the agents. The 
second part proposes an extension of this method enabling 
dynamic restructuring of coalitions when changes occur in 
the system.   
1. Introduction 
The search for economic efficiency has led to the division of 
labor between specialists. Today, similar reasoning explains 
the success of multi-agent systems. Using a set of 
specialized agents which coordinate their complex tasks 
gives more flexibility, efficiency and necessary evolutivity to 
programs. To perform complex tasks, agents need to 
coordinate, either because tasks require many resources if 
they are to be performed by a single agent, or because 
certain sub-tasks can be carried out more efficiently by 
specialized agents.  
How can autonomous agent be coordinated efficiently? 
One solution is to look for groups of agents which are able 
to perform the desired tasks better. This means that agents 
may form coalitions. A coalition is defined as a temporary 
association between agents in order to carry out joint 
projects. The aim is a better distribution of competences in 
order to achieve a complex project. This is not the only 
method of coordination. The choice of making coalitions 
depends on the type of problem. Coalitions are well adapted 
when there are strong externalities and/or when interactions 
between agents are such that the contribution of an agent 
within a coalition depends on which agents a coalition 
contains, in which case a bilateral contract would be difficult 
to negotiate.  
Once coalition formation is chosen as a coordination 
method, the definition of the corresponding protocol remains 
problematic. A coalition formation protocol is strongly 
dependent on the type of problem studied. The fact that the 
agents do or do not have the same objective, do or do not 
trust in others, are examples of parameters which may 
generate completely different protocols. To enable the 
agents to form coalitions, all current protocols make the 
assumption that the utility functions of agents, which 
measure their degree of satisfaction for each suggested 
solution, must be comparable or identical. This means that 
agents must be able to agree on a common utility function, 
either of all the agents as in [6], or of their coalition as in [1] 
and [8]. This assumption seems acceptable for most multi-
agent systems, in particular for productive projects where all 
utilities can often be calculated in terms of profit. However, 
in many cases comparing the utilities of agents, and even 
more so their aggregation, is delicate. The numerical 
measurement of the utility of an agent is already a strong 
assumption compared with the simple classification of 
available choices. Comparing the utilities of two individuals 
is stronger. Why should a solution weighted 8 by one agent 
and 6 by another be preferred to one weighted respectively 4 
and 7? Our model does not suppose that the utilities of 
agents must be aggregated or compared. A second limitation 
of current models lies in assuming that all calculations are 
recomputed as one condition changes (an agent joins or 
leaves a coalition, a task is added or canceled, etc.). 
However these protocols are very complex and these 
changes can be very frequent. Using the information 
obtained in a previous execution of the protocol, i.e. a 
dynamic reorganization of the coalitions formed, could 
decrease calculations. This is the second aim of our model. 
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes 
the application of the protocol and presents some definitions. 
Section 3 details our method for coalition formation and 
dynamic reorganization of coalitions. Our model gives a 
wide choice of agent behavior. Section 4 presents an 
application example of the protocol and discusses the 
implementation of our model. Section 5 analyzes related 
work. Section 6 draws a general conclusion from this work 
and proposes some perspectives. 
2.  Definitions 
The suggested protocol is particularly suitable for problems 
with complex tasks (where there is a need for several agents 
and for coalitions) and for dynamic problems (tasks may be 
added, others canceled or modified constantly) with different 
utility functions of agents. We assume the utility functions of 
the agents are unknown by the other agents and do not need 
to be cardinal, an ordinal utility is enough. Agents just need 
to be able to choose between two situations (or to be 
indifferent). A good example of this problem is a distributed 
teaching schedule at university. This application illustrates 
the dynamic evolution of the coalitions, as often a course 
may be added or removed, or a professor or a group of 
students may join the establishment. In this example we 
consider two types of agents: professors and groups of 
students. The classes correspond to the tasks to be carried 
out. Thus, agents form a coalition for each class. Most 
coalitions are formed of two agents: a professor agent and a 
student agent (having more agents in a coalition is also 
possible, for instance for lectures with several groups of 
students). Each (student or professor) agent defines the 
utility it assigns to each schedule. Since its utility function 
is ordinal, it just needs to be able to compare two schedules 
and to say which it prefers or that it is indifferent. Agents 
are free to choose their parameters while computing their 
utility. A professor can thus prefer the morning, refuse 
Monday, prefer certain classes, like a stable schedule, etc. 
In a general way, the choice of an agent depends on the 
members of the coalitions in which it will take part. But its 
appreciation of a coalition may also vary according to the 
other coalitions. This introduces externalities or an ordered 
processing of tasks.  
Let us now give some useful definitions for our method. 
 Coalition: a coalition is formed for each task. It contains 
zero, one or more agents which will carry out actions in 
order to achieve a task. Each action and its parameters are 
defined (for instance, the parameters of the action “taking a 
class” are: the week, the day and the time).  
Coalition set: a coalition set represents a solution to the 
problem of coalition formation. It contains as many 
coalitions as tasks to be performed at a given moment (in 
our application, a set corresponds to one schedule).  
Group of coalition sets: a group of coalition sets 
corresponds to several sets of coalitions brought together in 
order to be computed and transmitted collectively (for 
instance, several possible schedules). In the rest of this 
article, if will be referred to as a group of sets or simply a 
group. When an agent computes a group of equivalent sets, 
this means that it is indifferent regarding all the sets of 
coalitions in this group (for instance, it computes a group 
with those schedules that it prefers to others and that it 
cannot classify).  
Context: a set of unspecified parameters which must be 
stable during a negotiation step. For instance, it may 
concern a date or any external parameter.  
Utility function: the utility function may be ordinal or 
cardinal. If it is cardinal, it associates a utility with a set of 
coalitions within a given context. If it is ordinal, it 
compares two sets in a given context. In this case, 
measuring the utility of a set means comparing it with a 
reference situation which will be the same one throughout 
the negotiation.  
Reference situation: so that the agents know if they 
have to accept a set of coalitions as a solution, they need to 
be able to compare it with what they are sure to obtain 
during the negotiation. This minimum is the reference 
situation. If no coalition has yet been formed, the reference 
situation is the situation where nobody does anything. If 
there are already coalitions, it is the current situation, with 
possibly some changes in order to take into account new 
information (cf. section 3). To be sure to find a solution 
after a negotiation, the reference situation needs to be 
feasible and to be the same for all the agents.  
Acceptable set: we consider that a set is acceptable for 
an agent if it is preferred or equivalent to the current 
reference situation.  
Pareto optimum: a Pareto optimum is a situation where 
it is not possible to improve the situation of an agent 
without deteriorating that of at least one other.  
3. Coordination Method 
3.1. Presentation 
As we do not intend to aggregate the utilities of the agents, 
we seek a solution which is "objectively good", i.e. which 
may not be contested by any agent. A logical criterion 
likely to be accepted by all the agents is that we cannot 
increase the utility of an individual without deteriorating 
that of at least one other. If this does not happen, i.e. there 
is a situation such that we can increase the utility of an 
individual without deteriorating that of another, there is no 
reason not to prefer this situation. The solution must thus 
be a Pareto optimum.  
Which Pareto optimum should we choose? Now the 
problem is to compare the utilities of different agents. How 
should we choose between a schedule which is the first 
choice of a professor and another which is the first choice 
of a student? One solution is to avoid making a choice but 
to find a Pareto optimum. This offers the advantage of 
reducing computations as agents are not obliged to 
compute them all. The only constraint is that each agent 
should find it interests in accepting this solution, therefore 
in prefering this solution to the initial situation. The first 
aim of our protocol is thus to find a Pareto optimum likely 
to be accepted by all the agents as early as possible.  
How is a Pareto optimum obtained? The agent which 
initiates a negotiation seeks one or more sets of coalitions it 
prefers (cf. section 5) and chooses an agent to which it 
sends them (cf. section 3.2). Then it seeks the set(s) that it 
would choose as a second choice and sends them to that 
agent, and so on, until there are no more sets at least 
equivalent to the current situation. When an agent receives 
a group of sets, it evaluates them and sends them to the 
next agent sorted in decreasing order of preference. When 
an agent receives a group of sets, if there is at least one set 
which is preferable or equivalent to the current situation 
and if all the agents have already taken part in the 
negotiation, the set of this group that it prefers is a Pareto 
optimum and may be used as a solution set for the 
negotiation. For instance, let us consider two agents and 
seven sets of possible coalitions. Let E(U1;U2) be the 
relative utilities of agents 1 and 2 for the set E. Having E0 
as the initial situation, the seven possible sets are: E0(0;0); 
E1(0;10); E2(2;8); E3(4;8); E4(4;5); E5(-2;2); E6(10;-1) (cf. 
figure 1). Of these seven sets, three are Pareto optima (E1, 
E3 and E6). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Describing all possible solutions in a utility space  
Agent 1 initiates the negotiation. It sorts all the 
acceptable sets for it in equivalent groups of sets (cf. figure 
2): G1(E6); G2(E4;E3); G3(E2); G4(E0;E1). E5 is not sorted as 
the reference situation (E0) is better.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Group of sets of agent 1 
Groups G1, G2, G3 and G4 are sent in this order to the  
next agent. Thus, agent 2 starts by receiving G1 and 
evaluates it. Set E6 is unacceptable for the agent because it 
would bring a less satisfactory situation than the initial 
situation (figure 3). The agent does not send this set and 
waits for the rest. It receives G2 and sorts it into two sets 
(figure 4) in two groups G’1(E3) and G’2(E4). G’1 is 
acceptable. As all the other agents have already 
participated in the negotiation, agent 2 cannot send it. All 
the sets of G’1 can thus be a solution. The agent must 
choose E3, which is Pareto optimal. It sends this set to 
agent 1 in order to inform it of the result of the negotiation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. First group of agent 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
Figure 4. Second group of agent 2 
3.2. Algorithm 
The negotiation process is based on three phases: 
initialization of the negotiation and transfer of tasks, 
negotiation, transmission of the solution. We can 
distinguish the behavior of the agent which initiates the 
negotiation from the intermediate and final agents which 
take part in the negotiation. The order of the agents can 
differ from one negotiation to another. Each agent can be in 
any position. However, the order must be stable during a 
given negotiation.  
- Phase 1. Initialization of the negotiation and transfer of 
tasks. Any agent can initiate the negotiation. This action 
can result when a new task appears or when an agent 
modifies its preferences. The initiator agent informs the 
others that it begins a new negotiation and any agent which 
wants to begin another negotiation, must wait until the end 
of the negotiation in progress. To avoid conflicts between 
two simultaneous requests, each agent sends a 
confirmation. Each agent asks the other agents to send it 
their tasks. It then deduces the set of tasks to be performed 
and associates each one with a coalition. The initiator agent 
computes the sets of coalitions (cf. section 4 regarding 
complexity), gathers them in a group of sets and sends this 
group to the agent which must initiate the negotiation. 
Heuristics can be used to find the best group according to 
the context and the application. This improves the 
complexity of the algorithms. 
An example is to use and transmit undeveloped coalitions, 
i.e. the tasks for which all possible coalitions have not yet 
been computed. If an agent receives an undeveloped 
coalition in a set and this coalition cannot affect its utility 
(if it joins it or not), it leaves it aside and does not compute 
it. If it can, it computes all the possible combinations for 
the corresponding task. 
- Phase 2. Negotiation. When an agent receives a group 
of sets, it sorts the sets in order of  preference into 
homogeneous new groups of sets. In these groups, all sets 
are equivalent in terms of agent utility. The agent sorts only 
these sets that are least equivalent to the reference 
situation. The others are not considered. 
If the agent is not the last agent, it sends its new groups to 
the next agent in decreasing order of preference. If it is the 
last agent, and if this agent has created new groups because 
it has found acceptable sets, it considers that all the sets of 
the best new group are Pareto optima. It can thus choose 
one of them randomly and it will be the solution for the 
negotiation  
- Phase 3: Transmission of the solution. Once the last 
agent has identified a Pareto optimal solution, it sends this 
set to the other agents which accept it as the solution for the 
negotiation.  
Our protocol provides a solution, i.e. a set of coalitions 
with the initial conditions (utility functions, a set of tasks 
and a context). What happens if a change occurs in one of 
these conditions, for instance if a task is added or removed, 
or if an agent modifies its utility function? In current 
protocols, all the calculations must be redone to find a new 
solution to the problem. It seems a pity not to use the 
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results obtained in the current situation. New information 
should be added to the previous conditions, it should not 
completely replace them. A simple means to use earlier 
calculations is to start from the current solution. Instead of 
evaluating the different sets compared to an initial situation 
where no agent does anything, the agents will evaluate the 
new solutions compared to the current solution. As the 
solution is at least equivalent to the initial situation for all 
the agents (since it is Pareto optimal), it is difficult to find a 
similar or better one. Thus, fewer sets and groups of sets 
will be forwarded and evaluated. This will accelerate the 
problem solving process.  
The new reference situation must remain feasible and 
identical for all agents in spite of the new information. 
Thus it is not the current situation which is used as the 
reference situation but the modified current situation, in 
which all the changes have been taken into account. For 
instance, for an agent which leaves, the reference situation 
will be the current set of coalitions without this agent. For a 
removed task, it will be the current set of coalitions minus 
the coalition corresponding to the task.  
Heuristics can be used to find the best group according to 
the context and the application. This improves the 
complexity of the algorithms. The simplest solution 
(without heuristic) is that the first negotiator agent 
computes all the possible sets and then each agent makes 
an exhaustive classification of all the possible sets. The 
advantage of this solution is that it is simple, but it leads to 
a higher complexity, especially for the first agent. Other 
search methods can serve to improve the computation 
complexity and to distribute the calculations among the 
various agents. 
 - Using undeveloped coalitions. The proposed method 
using undeveloped coalitions reduces the calculations and 
the volume of the information transferred while preserving 
the ease of calculation by the agents.  
- Tests of intermediate acceptability. A complementary 
solution in order to reduce the number of iterations is to 
test if an (incompletely developed) set can be potentially 
preferred to the reference situation. If this is not the case, it 
will not be necessary to develop it. Thus this branch of the 
exploration tree can be forgotten. These tests are especially 
useful during the restructuring of coalitions. The reference 
situation is then the current situation that is likely to be 
very satisfactory for the agent. This agent can easily set 
aside many sets which will not give a better solution, 
especially if the agent does not prefer changes in its 
situation. 
- Search limited to the best group. The aim of an agent is 
to send to the next negotiator agent groups of sets 
organized in decreasing order of satisfaction. If the solution 
is in group Gi, all groups Gj with j>i have been evaluated, 
classified and probably developed unnecessarily. It would 
be useful to only evaluate the sets of G1, then those of G2, 
and so on. The problem is that agents do not know in 
advance what will be the degree of satisfaction associated 
with the best group. However, in order to evaluate only the 
members of G1, it is necessary to know the satisfaction 
which is associated with them, and therefore to have 
already evaluated them! Even if it is impossible to compute 
just the sets of the group, we can try to gradually limit 
computations to the useful sets. To do so, the agent needs a 
lower limit, which is the best evaluated set at this moment, 
and it will only develop the sets which are at least equal to 
this limit. Each time a set, even an incompletely developed 
one, is evaluated and is higher than the limit (in at least one 
of its future developments), it becomes the new limit. On 
the contrary, when an evaluated set cannot reach the limit, 
but can nevertheless be acceptable in a weaker group, it is 
preserved and added to a group which will be used as a 
starting group to compute the following groups.  
- Limited search using intermediate evaluation. In the 
previous case, the order in which the coalitions are 
developed is of great importance. The faster the best set is 
reached, the faster it becomes the reference situation and 
the less the other sets are developed (because the reference 
situation becomes rarely approachable). It is thus useful to 
set up an intermediate evaluation procedure of the sets to 
be developed in order to compute first of all the set which 
seems most likely to generate sets bringing great 
satisfaction.  
- Prospective search. In order better to use the utility 
function, instead of starting from an empty set and 
developing it, an agent can immediately use its knowledge 
of its utility function and the tasks to be achieved in order 
to deduce the best sets. If the number of possible sets is 
high, this solution can be advantageous since the 
complexity does not depend here on the number of possible 
sets but on the type of utility function of the agent. This 
method can give far more effective results but the 
procedure for each type of utility function needs to be 
rewritten.  
4. Implementation Results 
How should such a protocol be evaluated? We cannot 
check if the utility function is maximal, as we assume that 
the multi-agent system has several utility functions that are 
incomparable. We have checked that during the tests we 
always obtain a result and that this result is a Pareto 
optimum. We have analyzed the performance of the 
protocol by observing several parameters: the number of 
messages exchanged, the size of these messages (the 
number of coalition sets they contain) and number of 
coalition sets that have been evaluated. In the following, we 
will analyze the results of 4 agents (2 professors, 2 groups 
of students) and 2 classes. Each group does the two classes, 
i.e. we have four tasks in the system). Several experiments 
have been done with more agents. Four of the presented 
heuristics have been implemented. The heuristics which has 
given the best results and which has been used in the 
experiments described consists in seeking only the best 
group by doing intermediate tests as soon as possible in 
order to identify the value of the best group. The total size 
of the messages sent (figure 5) makes it possible to 
measure network obstruction. This size, measured with the 
number of sets, must be compared with the 83,521 possible 
sets.  
 
Figure 5. Total size of messages sent (measured by number of 
sets) during a negotiation with 4 agents and 4 tasks 
 
The purpose of dynamic restructuring of the coalitions is 
to give a result that is as satisfactory as our basic protocol 
but faster, which is possible because we use information 
drawn from the preceding negotiation by taking the 
previous solution as a new reference situation. The result 
will not necessarily (and probably will not) be the same, if 
the initial protocol has been applied, but the result is 
always a Pareto optimum. We can study the effect of 
adding new classes to the previous situation in terms of the 
number of sets evaluated and transmitted. We gradually 
added 4 classes to students 1 and 2 (starting with the first). 
The first negotiation (4 classes) used our basic protocol, 
whereas the others four are restructurings of the previous 
situation. The number of sets sent and evaluated must be 
compared with the total number of possible sets, which is 
always higher. It varies between 80,000 for 4 classes to 
7.109 for 8 classes. The average size of the messages sent 
during these additions is indicated in figure 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Size of messages sent (measured by number of sets) 
during a negotiation with 4 agents and classes varying from 4 to 8 
5. Related Work 
Coalition formation protocols have largely been inspired by 
work in game theory (cf. [3]), which has provided the 
concepts used in MAS for the analysis of this problem 
(typology of the problems, solutions, equilibriums, utility 
functions). Through power indices, it is possible to 
calculate the real influence of an agent in a coalition. Game 
theory provides methods of calculation to define the best 
coalitions in various types of problems. In particular, its 
application to multi-agent systems has been studied by 
Sandholm [5]. The limits of its use are related both to the 
underlying assumptions (the agents are generally 
considered as perfectly rational) and to the aim (game 
theory focuses generally on the value of the optimal 
solution and not on the most efficient method to reach that 
solution, never mind the most efficient distributed method).  
Current protocols in multi-agent systems are based on the 
following decomposition of the problem: generation of the 
coalitions, resolution of the optimization problem in each 
coalition and distribution of the created value between the 
agents. [6] proposes a simple and effective protocol. This 
protocol can be applied in very general cases (recovery of 
coalitions, scheduling) and makes it possible to find the 
best solution. However, it supposes that the agents have a 
common utility function. The protocol also implies that the 
value of the set of possible coalitions is calculated at least 
once. This gives a high complexity. [5] deals with this 
problem by proposing a method with a limited complexity 
while searching for a minimum result (with respect to the 
optimum result). [6] presents an analysis of the problems of 
having limits in calculation capacity and proposes a 
terminology adapted to this type of problem.  
In more recent work, [7] proposed an algorithm based on 
the principle of electing a leader for coalition formation. 
This algorithm has been applied to electronic commerce 
processes. This approach is similar to the one proposed in 
[1]. Lerman et al. have proposed an alternative, physics-
motivated mechanism for coalition formation that treats 
agents as randomly moving, locally interacting entities [4]. 
They consider that a new coalition may form when two 
agents meet randomly, and it may grow when a single agent 
randomly meets the coalition. The aim of this work was to 
define a mathematical model, formalized as a series of 
differential equations. These equations have steady state 
solutions that describe the equilibrium distribution of 
coalitions, but the authors have not given any details of the 
autonomous agent behaviors and how they concretely use 
this mathematical model. No algorithmic specifications 
have been proposed and the convergence of this model has 
not been addressed.  
Zlotkin and Rosenschein have proposed a mechanism for 
coalition formation that uses cryptography techniques for 
sub-additive task-oriented domains. This mechanism is 
based on a Shapley value. A Shapley value for an agent is a 
weighted average of all the utilities of the agent which 
contributes to all possible coalitions. The weight of each 
coalition is the probability that this coalition will be formed 
in a random process that starts with the first agent, and in 
which this coalition grows by one agent at a time such that 
each agent that joins the coalition is credited with its 
contribution to the coalition. The Shapley value is the 
expected utility that each agent will have from such a 
random process [9]. However, this mechanism can only be 
applied to small-sized multi-agent systems because of its 
combinatorial complexity due to the calculation of all 
possible coalitions. [1] and [8] are interested in problems 
where the agents have their own utility function and where 
an aggregation is necessary only within a coalition ([1]) or 
in an alliance ([8]). [1] uses the Choquet integral to carry 
out multi-criteria aggregations among agents which can be 
either cooperative or competitive. Moreover, the protocol 
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does not suppose that all the agents know each other. The 
protocol is limited however if the coalitions are disjoined. 
[8] studies the case of not disjoined coalitions which are 
formed gradually through alliances and progressive 
adaptation of the preferences of the agents (whose interest 
it is to adapt so as not to be excluded from the coalitions). 
It is difficult to compare our protocol with current 
protocols since it does not have the same objectives. In 
current protocols, utility functions of the agents are 
systematically aggregated or adapted. On the contrary, the 
utilities here are neither aggregate nor transmitted. The 
results cannot thus be compared because they relate to 
different problems. However, if all the agents have same 
utility function at the beginning, the protocol suggested 
should obtain the same result as that of [6] [1].  
6. Conclusion and Perspectives  
For the problem considered (formation and restructuring 
of coalitions without aggregation of agent preferences), we 
have shown that the protocol makes it possible to obtain a 
solution which is a Pareto optimum. Moreover, the tests 
have shown that the average complexity remained low 
compared to the total number of possible cases. In spite of 
these encouraging results, many improvements are still 
possible and are currently being addressed.  
Regarding the protocol, a logical extension would be to 
send sets with constraints on the coalitions instead of 
sending several independent sets of coalitions. For 
instance, in our application of drawing up schedules, 
instead of transmitting three sets of coalitions with the three 
alternatives time 1, time 2, time 3, one agent could send: 
"time ranging between 1 and 3". That would reduce the 
number of sets of coalitions to be computed and would 
enable the agent which receives them to make an intelligent 
search instead of having to evaluate all the sets without 
seeking links between them.  
In short, the protocol proposed is adapted to problems 
requiring coordination through the formation of coalitions 
and where it is not desirable, or possible, to aggregate the 
preferences of the agents. The protocol provides optimal 
Pareto-type solutions. If changes occur in the multi-agent 
system, it allows agents to compute new solution, which is 
always optimal, dynamically and quickly, on the basis of 
the current solution.  
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